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INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of High-Speed Rail (HSR) in Canada is gaining 
popularity in the wake of transportation sustainability. HSR is defined 
as public infrastructure for rail transit systems capable of traveling 200 
km/h (125 mph) or faster.1 But if HSR develops in Canada, how should 
it be pursued when public authorities often face infrastructure deficits? 
The answer appears to be in public-private partnerships (P3s or PPPs). 
P3s have become the preferred method in Canada to build public 
infrastructure assets such as roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals. 
Canada’s P3s have rich sources in local provincial and municipal 
procurement processes. P3s are also popular among those jurisdictions 
with HSR (including France, Japan, China, Germany, and Spain), and 
those currently building HSR (such as California).2 The popularity of 
P3s in public infrastructure development is largely due to how they 
share risks, duties, and rewards, while promoting efficiency in project 
bundling. This means that from start to finish, all stages of development 
are tied to specific milestones, giving certainty to both public 
authorities and private investors. There is no single P3 model—a P3 
adapts to the needs and circumstances of the public infrastructure 
project. This flexibility allows public authorities, along with the private 
sector, to tailor their interests. 
This Article demonstrates how P3s can help build HSR3 in Canada’s 
transportation sector. In doing this, this Article compares P3s to 
 
1 JULIE TASKER-BROWN & JUDITH PATTERSON, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON HIGH-SPEED 
RAIL IN THE QUEBEC-WINDSOR CORRIDOR: ADDRESSING THE DISTANCE/DENSITY 
DEBATE 3 (2014), http://ctrf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/A-New-Perspective-on-High  -
Speed-Rail-in-the-Quebec.pdf. 
2 Since 1994, the private sector has invested over $260 billion (USD) in P3s around the 
world (mainly in Europe, Australia, and Canada). PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 
DELIVERING THE PPP PROMISE−A REVIEW OF PPP ISSUES AND ACTIVITY 26 (2005), 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/government-infrastructure/pdf/promisereport.pdf [hereinafter 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS]. 
3 The legal issues affecting HSR generally include: (1) Corporate Law—partnerships of 
public and private entities; (2) Contract Law—P3 Agreements; (3) Administrative and 
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traditional procurement using examples of Canadian P3s in roadways 
and light rail transit, as well as international P3 examples used for HSR. 
The public procurement process in Canada is becoming more open and 
competitive for private sector participants involved in building public 
assets. The growing recognition of P3s at all levels of government 
(federal, provincial, and municipal) for public asset development 
means that it is reasonably foreseeable for HSR to develop from it. 
Together, the domestic and international examples reveal how P3s are 
practical tools to deploy HSR in Canada. While P3s are not the only 
choice to pursue HSR, they are a much better alternative to the 
traditional procurement model. 
Part I explains both public infrastructure development and P3s. Part 
II assesses the advantages and disadvantages of P3s. Part III discusses 
the elements of P3s, as well as municipal P3s. Part IV examines three 
successful Canadian P3s in Edmonton and Winnipeg, and then 
describes three international examples of P3s with mixed results in the 
Netherlands, Taiwan, and California. From these examples, Part V 
applies the best practices and principles of P3s to determine how 
Canada can pursue its own HSR and suggests various 
 
Municipal Law— procurement process (with RFQs and RFPs); (4) Transportation Law—
Federal Surface Transportation Policy and Laws (Transport Canada), dealing with track 
lines extending beyond provincial boundaries (including electrification), and airports (under 
federal jurisdiction), as well as Provincial Transportation Policy and Law, involving 
provincial and municipal transportation agencies, and the regulation of track lines within 
provincial boundaries; (5) Property Law—Expropriation—Land Acquisition (purchase of 
private land for public purposes in exchange for reasonable compensation (includes public 
consultation), and Re-Zoning, involving rezoning of municipal and rural bylaws; (6) 
Environmental Law—Environmental Assessments (conducting federal Environmental 
Assessments (EAs) for industrial development affecting communities and ecosystems), and 
Public Consultation (as part of the environmental regulatory process, public consultations 
would address impacts of development on surrounding communities); and (7) Employment 
and Labour Law—Employment and Public Safety (Canada Labour Code). The advantages 
of HSR are that it: reduces carbon emissions (improves air quality); decreases travel time 
for passengers between destinations; reduces congestion and accidents on highways/reduces 
congestion at airports; enhances tourism (access to resorts); promotes efficient commerce 
(increase commercial ties between cities); reduces need for land to avoid expansion of roads; 
stimulates research and development; creates new jobs in alternative transportation; creates 
spin-off effects economic development; and represents innovative urban development by 
integrating transportation systems. The disadvantages of HSR are that it: can be costly (in 
the billions, depending on the region); may not be high enough to justify its use considering 
population densities; does not share the same track as conventional trains—a separate, 
dedicated track is required; and requires land to build stations and install a track system. 
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recommendations. The author concludes that P3s represent the most 
effective way to build HSR in the world’s second largest nation. 
I 
PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA 
Public infrastructure development involves government and private 
sources in the design, building, financing, operation, and maintenance 
of public assets.4 There are two models for public infrastructure 
development: traditional procurement and P3s. Traditional 
procurement is when the government oversees a procurement process 
where prospective private investors participate in a competitive bidding 
process. The government pays for up-front capital costs, planning, and 
designing, while the private sector is responsible for delivering the 
public asset, such as a road, bridge, or light-rail transit. Moreover, the 
public authority awards multiple contracts to different private entities, 
usually for duties such as grading, paving, bridge construction, and 
lighting. Here, the government provides all financing, thereby 
assuming the risks for the entire project. But governments face 
“infrastructure deficits,” where they have limited financial resources to 
pay for capital costs for public infrastructure. The “deficit” lies between 
the actual infrastructure costs and the public finances available. As 
such, taxpayers must pay the difference for any infrastructure project. 
In contrast, P3s allow public authorities and the private sector (or 
private partner) to share financing, skills, resources, and technology 
using a more open, transparent, and flexible procurement process. P3s 
are rigorous—they set clear, specific documents, technical and legal 
specifications, and milestones from start to finish. This means that 
during the lifecycle of the project, the private partner must comply with 
the project’s requirements, thereby ensuring on-time delivery of the 
public asset. In P3s, payment to the private sector is tied to service 
outcomes and performance of the public asset over its lifecycle. The 
private sector will usually design, build, finance, and operate/maintain 
the public project, and will seek revenues only upon completion of the 
project. 
Thus, choosing between traditional procurement or P3s is relevant, 
considering that Canada spends heavily in its transportation sectors. In 
 
4 In Canada, there are currently sixty-seven transportation infrastructure projects worth 
over $53 billion (CAD), more than health care ($26.5 billion), energy ($26 billion), justice 
($5 billion), and education ($3 billion). Gov’t of Canada, Chapter 3.4−Investing in 
Infrastructure (2015), http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch3-4-eng.html. 
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2017, total federal investment of $187.5 billion (CAD) was made in 
Canada’s public infrastructure projects.5 Included in those 
infrastructure projects were forty-one projects in transportation (light 
rail transit and roadways) worth $83.3 billion. Since the 1990s, P3s 
efficiently delivered many public infrastructure projects at all levels of 
government—around eighty-three percent of all P3 projects in Canada 
were delivered on time.6 So what is a P3? How does it lead to better 
value for public infrastructure assets? 
II 
WHAT ARE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (P3S)? 
In broad terms, a P3 is a partnership between public and private 
entities for mutual benefit in achieving a specific purpose for the public 
interest.7 In more precise terms, a P3 is a long-term sharing of 
resources, risks, and rewards between the public and private sectors to 
design, build, finance, operate, and maintain public infrastructure 
assets such as transportation, energy, health, water/wastewater, justice, 
real estate, and affordable housing.8 It is an alternative to traditional 
 
5 Andrew Macklin, Top 100−An In-Depth Look at Canada’s Biggest Public 
Infrastructure Projects, RENEW CANADA 12 (Jan./Feb. 2017), http://renewcanada.net 
/archives/. 
6 VIJAY GILL & SARAH DIMICK, CANADA AS A GLOBAL LEADER: DELIVERING VALUE 
THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AT HOME AND ABROAD THE CONFERENCE 
BOARD OF CANADA 22 (2013), www.infrastructure.alberta.ca/documents/14-004_P3 
Leader_RPT_-_08_21_13.pdf. 
7 The World Bank’s definition of a P3 is: “[A]ny organization designed to promote or 
improve PPPs . . . [and has] a lasting mandate to manage multiple PPP transactions, often in 
multiple sectors.” WORLD BANK, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP UNITS: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 2 (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPINFRASTRUCT/Re 
sources/855084-1207760724582/Executive-PPP-Units.pdf. 
8 The Canadian Council for P3s (CCPPP) defines P3s as: “A cooperative venture between 
the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks, and rewards.” 
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, Definitions & Models, 
http://www.pppcouncil.ca/web/Knowledge_Centre/What_are_P3s_/Definitions_Models 
/web/P3_Knowledge_Centre/About_P3s/Definitions_Models.aspx?hkey=79b9874d-4498 -
46b1-929f-37ce461ab4bc (last visited June 10, 2017). According to the CCPPP, there are 
several examples of P3s in Canada, including P3s Canada Inc. (federal), Infrastructure 
Ontario, Alberta Infrastructure, SaskBuilds, Partnerships BC, Partnerships New Brunswick, 
and La Société Québecoise Des Infrastructures (SQI). By jurisdiction, most P3 projects are 
provincial in nature, while the rest are municipal and federal. See generally STEVEN HOBBS, 
AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA (May 19, 2016), 
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procurement to build public assets where the public owner contracts 
with a private partner to ultimately deliver a public asset. In other 
words, a P3 is not privatization, but merely a license for the private 
partner to help the public authority build a project for the public 
interest. In essence, P3s allow for public infrastructure development 
where the state uses private capital and resources to advance public 
policy goals. 
The public owner includes all levels of government, including 
federal, provincial/state, and municipal governments. The private 
sector typically includes construction/engineering firms, architects, 
manufacturers, accounting/finance, equity investors, and lenders.9 The 
history of P3s dates back to the 1990s. In addressing infrastructure 
deficits, nations such as Spain, France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, 
United Kingdom, and Australia began using P3s to build both large and 
small public infrastructure projects. Canada also used P3s for its public 
infrastructure since the 1990s, and its own P3 market matured to the 
extent that it became a very popular policy tool.10 Evolving issues for 
P3s include: (1) insufficient risk transfer from the public to the private 
sector; (2) lack of transparency and openness in the bidding process of 
traditional procurement; and (3) failing to keep the long-term goal of 
the project in mind. 
The procurement process falls under the local regulatory framework. 
This means that private bidders must deal with a host of complex laws 
and regulations. This represents a transactional cost to the bidder for 
complying with procurement regulations. To reduce this burden, the P3 
standardizes the procurement process by requiring open and fair 
disclosure of certain documents (e.g., financial statements, and 
references), and following recommended guidelines and best practices. 
Upon reviewing the disclosure, public authorities then structure the P3 
agreement in a holistic manner—addressing all issues in the lifecycle 
of the project and coordinating all stakeholders at different levels. This 
improves communication between the procurement agency and the 
 
https://www.edco.on.ca/resources/Documents/Steve%20Hobbs%20Public%20Pri 
vate%20Partnerships.pdf. 
9 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS viii−ix (Dec. 2004), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/pppdec2004/pp 
pdec2004.pdf. 
10 Several examples of P3s in Canada’s transportation sector include: (1) Edmonton’s 
Anthony Henday Drive; (2) Calgary’s Stoney Trail (NE and SE); (3) Winnipeg’s Chief 
Peguis Trail and Disraeli Bridges; (4) city of Barrie P3 Transit Service Project; (5) Quebec’s 
Bridge for St. Lawrence; and (6) Vancouver’s Canada Line. GILL & DIMICK, supra note 6, 
at 38. 
ZAIDI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  11:30 AM 
2018] Public-Private Partnerships as a Model for 137 
High Speed Rail Development in Canada—Towards Efficient 
and Alternative Public Infrastructure 
private sector on technical, legal, and financial matters. The P3 unit 
keeps the interested parties in line with the long-term goals of the 
public infrastructure project, which ensures that each stakeholder keeps 
its eyes on the final project by complying with regulatory requirements. 
Without this oversight of the governing agency, overall quality control 
suffers. 
P3s are popular mainly because they result in cost savings.11 Cost 
savings derive from lifecycle optimization, construction 
efficiencies/innovations, and shifting of risks from public to private 
entities. Lifecycle optimization is created through project bundling, 
where all stages of development in the project are lumped into a single, 
comprehensive contract as a P3 agreement. This comprehensive 
contract creates more certainty for both the public and private entities 
and avoids the disjointed aspects of project development in traditional 
procurement, which often create internal inefficiencies. The 
procurement process is efficient and predictable.12 There is a steady 
flow of revenue from a long-lasting public asset in the form of 
concessions. A concession refers to when permission is given to a 
private firm to build and operate a public asset so that it may collect 
revenue from that asset for a fixed period of time. Here, the private firm 
recovers their initial investment in the project, including design, 
construction, borrowing costs, operation, and maintenance. The private 
sector earns revenue during the lifecycle of the P3 project, which 
usually lasts twenty to forty years. Taxpayers will pay only their 
portion for the costs of a P3 project; the private developer pays the rest. 
The clear advantage for the public sector is that payments to the private 
sector are spread over the lifecycle of the public asset.13 This prevents 
taxpayers from paying at the beginning of the project. The issue is 
whether P3s are more cost-effective and efficient in building public 
infrastructure assets when compared to traditional procurement. 
 
11 For instance, costs savings of P3s is about thirteen percent more compared to 
traditional procurement (according to value for money studies). Id. at ii. 
12 The average procurement process time in Canada is eighteen months, compared to 
three years in the United Kingdom. Id. 
13 See Gunnar Alexandersson & Staffan Hultén, Prospects and Pitfalls of Public-Private 
Partnerships in Railway Transportation–Theoretical Issues and Empirical Experience, 
STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 2 (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.thredbo-conference-
series.org/downloads/thredbo10-papers/thredbo10-themeC-Alexandersson-Hulten.pdf. 
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Under P3s, the public sector often enters into a P3 agreement with a 
private consortium to pursue large, costly, and complex projects.14 But 
the private sector assumes the operational and maintenance risks 
normally placed on the government. Payment to the private sector is 
based on usage and availability. That is, payments relate to meeting 
outputs—annual payments from government for projects with direct 
user fees (road tolls or rail fares).15 
Indeed, at all levels governments are promoting P3s for public 
infrastructure development. The Conference Board of Canada reported 
that P3s create efficiency gains for the public sector in terms of time 
and costs during the construction period. Such efficiency gains were 
tied to output-based contract specifications, private financing, 
integration of planning for building and maintenance, and the transfer 
of risks from public to private entities. The Deputy Director General of 
the European Commission, Zoltan Kazatsay, once stated: 
 Efficient use of PPP schemes in delivering necessary transport 
investments can help ease the pressure on public finances and deficits 
as well as contribute to more stable economic growth and increased 
transparency of public spending; by maximizing the value of public 
money, more can be built and operated with given amounts of public 
resources. False PPP arrangements work best where there is an 
explicit policy commitment by national governments to involve the 
private sector, a clear long-term political will, a high-quality 
partnership, transparency, clearly specified financial guarantees, and 
an established, stable legal environment.16 
The above quote indicates three key points. First, political will for 
P3s is necessary to attract private investment to build large, complex 
public infrastructure projects, thereby easing the burden on the 
taxpayer. Second, there should be an open, fair, and transparent P3 
process, where clear evaluative criteria are available to prospective 
bidders to bid on a project. When the private sector realizes that the 
procurement (bidding) process is open and fair, they will likely 
participate in submitting bids. The more submissions of competitive 
bids, the more likely the public project will be realized to serve the 
public interest. Third, a stable legal framework creates certainty and 
 
14 There are various models of P3s, including the Design Build Finance Maintain Operate 
(DBFMO), Design Build Finance Own Maintain Operate Transfer (DBFOMOT), Design 
Build Finance and Maintain (DBFM), and Design Build Finance (DBF). ASS’N OF 
CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANIES, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA 14–16, http://www.acec.ca/files/resources/acec_P3_report_v3 
.pdf. 
15 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 15. 
16 Id. at 6. 
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flexibility for private bidders. When the private sector becomes 
familiar with P3 procurements, together with adequate funding from all 
levels of government, they gain confidence in the P3 project. 
III 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF P3S 
Although P3s are preferred in Canada, one must objectively evaluate 
their advantages and disadvantages, as not all P3s necessarily deliver 
public assets. Figure 1 below shows the advantages and disadvantages 
of P3s. 
Figure 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of P3s 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Sharing of Resources and Expertise 
between Public and Private 
- private sector has expertise and 
financing 
- cost savings in efficiencies and 
innovations 
Hold-Ups 
- delays are created when 
unexpected events occur, such as 
poorly designed P3 agreements 
failing to cover risks 
Financing−Generation of Capital and 
Cost Containment  
- avoids burdening public 
authorities to increase taxes 
- internal efficiencies 
o lenders have strict due 
diligence requirements for 
borrowers−use technical 
consultants to ensure realistic 
revenue forecasts) 
Lock-ins 
- debt interest rate may be locked in 
on historical interest rate for a 
long time, rather than re-
negotiating debt at various times 
- some non-competition clauses 
limit system-wide planning and 
service integration 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
Project Bundling 
- merging all stages of development 
(design, build, finance, operation 
and maintenance) 
o Creates certainty for investors 
(clear schedules, financing, 
targets) 
- Costs are considered throughout 
the life of the project 
Government Bailouts 
- public authority may need to 
bailout private partner due to 
bankruptcy or other issues (does 
not occur with traditional 
procurement) 
- private partner may not handle 
transferred risks  
  
Procurement process is fair, 
competitive, transparent, and efficient 
- ensures accountability among 
bidders in the bidding process 
- creates strong and flexible 
regulatory framework 
Cost Overruns 
- the overall cost of the project may 
go beyond original estimates 
- risk allocation will include 
additional costs to compensate the 
private partner for taking on 
public sector risks (e.g., RFP 
costs) 
Transfer of Risk from Public to Private 
(Risk Allocation) 
- risks are clearly identified 
- public money does not begin to 
flow until asset is fully operational 
Collusion in Bidding Process 
- a private bidder may give distorted 
disclosure to gain bidding 
advantages 
- results in unfair, costly bidding 
Technological Innovation 
- projects demand creativity and 
innovation among private partners 
- emergence of new technology for 
sustainable projects 
Limited Public Consultation 
- confidentiality in P3 agreements 
may limit public consultation on 
the project 
Quicker, On-time Delivery of Public 
Asset  
- Payment is tied to Delivery and 
Performance of Public Asset 
Changing Needs of the Project  
- the conditions, environment, and 
technological needs of the project 
may change over time 
Creates Off-Balance Sheets 
- governments only account for the 
annual payments it makes to the 
P3 company, and not for the 
project’s assets and liabilities 
(keeps government deficits low) 
Possible Negative Impacts on Unions 
- unions may contest impact of P3 
on their members 
We have discussed the advantage of P3s, but what about its 
disadvantages? First, there may be cost overruns. Some commentators 
criticize P3s as being more expensive than traditional procurement. 
This occurs when private consortia build “insurance premiums” into 
their own bids to deal with unforeseen delays and increased costs.17 The 
use of private debt to finance public projects may inflate the bid price 
 
17 Anthony E. Boardman, Matti Siemiatycki, & Aidan R. Vining, The Theory of Evidence 
Concerning PPPs in Canada and Elsewhere, 9 UNIV. OF CALGARY SPP RESEARCH PAPERS 
1 (2016), https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/p3-boardman-siemia 
tycki-vining.pdf. 
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compared to traditional procurement. Second, government bailouts 
may occur, in which the private partner fails as a business, resulting in 
no public asset. This occurs when there are internal problems, poor 
management, or exposure to market forces. Third, collusion may result 
among private bidders. 
The private bidders may give an inadequate or false disclosure that 
misrepresents their abilities to handle the fundamental requirements of 
the project (e.g., having proper finances or adequate technology). As a 
result, the P3 project may be delayed or become costlier. In response 
to these negative experiences, policy planners set strict evaluative 
criteria during the P3 procurement process, where private bidders 
attend public informational meetings to provide adequate disclosure in 
the Requests for Qualifications (RFQ) and Request for Proposals (RFP) 
stages. Here, the public authority can review the disclosure to assess 
risks and assess costs during the lifecycle of the project. This limits cost 
overruns and reveals the capacity of the private partner to handle all 
aspects of the project. 
IV 
ELEMENTS AND STAGES OF P3S−HOW P3S WORK IN CANADA 
What is responsible for making P3s so effective in Canadian public 
infrastructure development? The answer lies in its core elements, 
namely: 
• Policy and Law 
 ° Federal: New Building Canada Plan 
  ° Provincial: Public authorities (Provincial Procurement 
Agency) 
• The Procurement Process 
 ° RFQs and RFPs 
  ♦ Value for Money (VfM) 
• P3 Agreement 
°  Clauses addressing all P3 stages of development (design, 
build, finance, operate/maintain) 
° Clauses include legal, financial, and technical issues 
A. Policy and Law 
In Canada, the construction, repair, or renovation of public 
infrastructure works are guided by both public works and traditional 
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procurement policies and laws. These are regulated by public 
authorities (known as provincial procurement agencies).18 In contrast, 
P3s are guided by provincial infrastructure frameworks and guidelines. 
Within these guidelines lie the basic principles of P3s and the overall 
process of its own procurement. Each province has a Ministry of 
Transport that issues standards and guidelines for transportation 
projects for both traditional procurement and P3s. Since the 1990s, the 
legislative intent among Canadian legislators is clear—to encourage 
the use of P3s in building public infrastructure projects at all levels of 
government. The current federal New Building Canada Plan (2013) is 
a ten-year plan to fund $53 billion to the provinces, territories, and 
municipalities for public infrastructure projects using P3s.19 
The federal Department of Public Works and Government Services 
Act (1996) guides federal projects,20 while its provincial equivalents 
deal with provincial P3 projects under public works legislation (such 
as the Public Works Act in Alberta, the Public Works Agreement Act 
in British Columbia, and the Public Works Protection Act in Ontario).21 
Local procurement processes are highlighted in legislation, stressing 
for governments to pursue public projects only where practical. For 
instance, Section 3 of Alberta’s Public Works Act states: “When it 
appears practical or expedient to the Ministry to do so, the Ministry 
may by invitation or public notice call for tenders for the construction, 
 
18 The provincial procurement agencies are often headed by ministries of infrastructure, 
finance, and justice that create P3 standards, formal documentation, and a strict evaluation 
process for all participant bidders in the public project. These agencies all use different 
names in different jurisdictions—Infrastructure Ontario, Infrastructure Quebec, Partnerships 
BC, Partnerships New Brunswick, and Alberta Alternative Capital Financing Office. 
GODYNE SIBAY, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 80, https://www.mccarthy.ca/marcomm 
/DBIC/2016/DBIC_Chapters/13_Public-Private_Partnerships.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
19 DEP’T OF FIN. CANADA, CHAPTER 3.3: THE NEW BUILDING CANADA PLAN (2013), 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/new_template/2013/doc/plan/chap3-3-eng.html [hereinafter PPP 
CANADA FUNDING]. 
20 Dep’t of Public Works & Gov’t Servs. Act, R.S.C. 1996, c 16 (Can.). 
21 There are several public procurement laws and policies in Canada. For instance, British 
Columbia has its Procurement Services Act, S.B.C. 2003, c 22; Alberta has its Public Works 
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c P-46; Ontario has its Public Works Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c P-55, 
and the Broader Public Sector Accountability Act, S.O. 2010, c 25; Newfoundland and 
Labrador has its Public Tender Act, S.N.L. 1990, c P-45; New Brunswick has its 
Procurement Act, S.N.B. 2012, c 20; Nova Scotia has its Province of Nova Scotia 
Sustainable Procurement Policy and Public Procurement Act, S.N.S. 2014, c 34; Prince 
Edward Island has its Public Purchasing Act, R.S.P.E.I. 2014, c P-32; and Québec has An 
Act Respecting Contracting by Public Bodies and The Regulation Respecting Supply 
Contracts of Public Bodies, S.Q. C-65.1. 
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demolition, alteration and repair of and the supplying of materials for 
public works.”22 
1. Manitoba’s Public-Private Partnership Transparency and 
Accountability Act 
Manitoba has modern P3 legislation in its Public-Private Partnership 
Transparency and Accountability Act (2013).23 The Act applies to 
major capital P3 projects of $120 million or more, which are regulated 
by public authorities. Here, public authorities mean the Government of 
Manitoba, municipalities, and local governments. The general purpose 
of the Act is to enhance transparency and accountability in the decision-
making process leading up to a P3 project. This is achieved in the 
following ways: 
• Conduct a detailed risk assessment (Value for Money) to 
determine if the P3 is preferable to traditional procurement; 
• Follow conflict of interest rules for consultants hired by public 
authorities; 
• Seek consultation of the public prior to the competitive bidding 
process; 
• Use an independent fairness monitor to oversee the procurement 
process; and 
• Have the public authority publish results of the P3 to the public. 
Transparency and accountability provisions are built into the statute. 
Section 7(1) of the Act states: “A public sector entity that uses the P3 
procurement method for a major capital project must appoint an 
external consultant to act as its fairness monitor for the project.”24 That 
 
22 Public Works Act, R.S.A. 2000, c P-46, www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Acts/P46.pdf 
(last visited June 10, 2017). Various issues covered by such Acts include expropriation, the 
public tendering process (competitive bidding), and development plans. Supporting this 
legal regime are public accountability laws such as British Columbia’s Budget Transparency 
and Accountability Act, S.B.C. 2000, c 23, www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/lc/statreg/00 
023_01#section23. 
23 JOHN STEFANIUK, MANITOBA LEGISLATION REGULATING P3 PROJECTS PROCLAIMED 
INTO FORCE 2 (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.tdslaw.com/resource/manitoba-legislation-
regulating-p3-projects-proclaimed-into-force/. Manitoba is uniquely situated in that, unlike 
other provinces like Ontario, British Columbia (BC), and Alberta, it does not have a public 
infrastructure agency. Id. 
24 Public-Private Partnerships Transparency and Accountability Act § 7(1), C.C.S.M., c. 
P.245. 
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is, an independent party is appointed to review the entire procurement 
process on behalf of the public sector, and avoid any potential conflict 
of interest issues with the public authority handling the project. The 
duties of the fairness monitor are clearly outlined in Manitoba’s Act in 
terms of publishing a report for the public sector. Section 7(2)(a) states: 
“The duties of the fairness monitor under the terms of his or her 
appointment must include . . . advising the public sector entity on the 
procurement process for the purpose of ensuring that it is conducted 
with openness, transparency, integrity, and accountability.”25 
The Act describes any P3 project where a private partner assumes 
all or substantially all of the project’s design, construction, financing, 
operations, and maintenance. The Act makes clear that ownership of 
the P3 project reverts back to the public authority. The Act also 
contains the Public-Private Partnership Regulation,26 which sets out the 
project’s preliminary analysis, public consultation requirement, and 
contract regime. The preliminary analysis must include anticipated 
project costs, a quantitative risk assessment, a risk allocation matrix, a 
cost benefit analysis, an evaluation of efficiency gains, discount rates, 
and value for money. 
The Regulation also requires a comparison of time frames for 
delivery of the public asset, including the level of expertise of each 
private partner. The Regulation clarifies the scope of the P3 
agreement—a description of the project, names of parties, payment 
structure, amount of security deposited, and insurance. The Regulation 
stresses confidentiality of P3 agreement issues to preserve the interests 
of the private partner. Confidentiality is necessary in this respect 
because it may discourage the private bidder to participate in public 
disclosure of their own information.27 
Governments often struggle with infrastructure deficits by 
experiencing budget shortages to build such projects. To remedy this 
challenge, the federal New Building Canada Plan was introduced to 
assist governments in public infrastructure through direct funding, 
avoiding traditional procurement that relies exclusively on public 
capital expenditures. The federal contribution is limited to one-third of 
costs for a P3 project. To qualify for this funding, there must be a 
showing of a public benefit, such as reducing traffic congestion, 
improving mobility, and environmental sustainability (particularly on 
 
25 Id. § 7(2)(a). 
26 Public-Private Partnership Regulation, C.C.S.M. Reg126/2013, c P.245. 
27 STEFANIUK, supra note 23, at 4. 
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projects over $100 million).28 The choice of this Canadian policy was 
influenced by positive international experiences with P3s, particularly 
in England, Australia, and the European Union. 
In essence, to build public infrastructure assets, the federal plan 
discourages public authorities from using traditional, government-led 
procurement in favor of a blended approach with public and private 
resources in P3s. Under the auspices of the New Building Canada Plan 
is a funding mechanism known as the P3 Canada Fund. Managed by 
P3 Canada, a federal Crown corporation, the eligibility requirements 
for receiving funding of a project include: (1) it must foster economic 
growth; (2) it supports a clean environment; and (3) it promotes strong 
communities. If eligible, one may receive up to twenty-five percent of 
direct construction costs by way of loans, loan guaranties, or 
contributions.29 
B. The Procurement Process 
The procurement process is an invitation to prospective private 
bidders to file submissions to a public authority in building public 
projects. It is a comprehensive plan to obtain goods, services or works, 
financing, technology, and the expertise of qualified bidders (usually a 
consortium). The project’s requirements are set by the public authority 
as part of a competitive bidding process. The most compliant and 
valuable bid is usually the winning bid. In the public interest, the 
competitive bidding process must be open, transparent, and fair to 
avoid collusion and bias among the participants, as well as selecting 
qualified bidders—those best capable of handling the project. All 
details of the project from start to finish should be available for 
scrutiny, not only by the procurement agency responsible for the P3 
project, but also the general public. 
In Canada, there is a regulatory framework for the procurement 
process, managed by a public authority.30 The public authority consists 
 
28 2014 New Building Canada Plan, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://www.infra 
structure.gc.ca/plan/nbcp-npcc-eng.html (last updated Mar. 28, 2014). Eligible participants 
include all provinces, territories, and municipalities. This means that municipalities can 
apply directly for federal funding under the New Building Canada Plan. See id. 
29 PPP CANADA FUNDING, supra note 19, at 1. 
30 See TIMOTHY JOHN MURPHY & JASON J. ANNIBALE, EFFECTIVELY STRUCTURING 
AND MANAGING DESIGN-BUILD PROJECTS (2009), http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files 
/Effectively_Structuring_and_Managing_Design-build_Projects_1109.pdf (last visited Jan. 
18, 2018). In particular, the overseeing procurement agency helps prevent design errors or 
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of various committees, such as a working and oversight committee, 
steering committee, evaluation team, financial capacity team, and 
project manager. The provincial steering committee oversees capital 
projects and guides the entire P3 process. It ensures all approvals and 
monitors the project budget and schedule. The steering committee 
approves the Value for Money (VfM) analysis (risk assessment), and 
the final business terms and conditions slated for the P3 agreement. 
Oversight committees guide the project manager for submitted 
procurement documents (as part of due diligence), terms and 
conditions, risk allocations, schedules, and budget estimates. The 
oversight committee refers to policy, so that the project manager may 
consult them on all issues affecting the P3 project. Open and fair bids 
are met by a disclosure requirement upon the private bidder. Disclosure 
provides exact details of the project, including legal, financial, and 
technical aspects, particularly during informational meetings. Here, 
technical aspects are discussed, as well as negotiations for the P3 
agreement. 
The project manager delivers the project and oversees the entire P3 
project. This includes managing work teams, and delegating tasks to 
various committees. The project manager may be supported by a 
program ministry staff member and consultants (technical and legal). 
The project manager is also responsible for all documentation related 
to RFQs and RFPs (which forms the heart of the evaluation process), 
and the P3 agreement. The project manager must ensure that all 
approvals are made by relevant government ministries (cabinet, 
advisory, and capital financing), and manage all communication to 
interested parties. The evaluation team reviews all project proposals by 
applying an evaluation criteria under provincial procurement 
guidelines. 
The individual P3 project proposals include verifying private 
bidders’ submissions by checking references, along with preparing 
clarification questions for the bidder. A fairness auditor or monitor 
 
omissions, unforeseen site conditions, financial risks, and labor and material costs. 
COLUMBIA INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE: PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 22 (June 2009), http://www.civicgovernance.ca/wordpress/wp-content 
/uploads/columbiap3_eng_v8-webpdf.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). An example of a 
Canadian procurement agency is Ontario’s Infrastructure Ontario (IO), which helps with 
Alternative Financing and Procurement (AFP) on large, complex public infrastructure 
projects. Id. IO’s purpose is to lead the procurement process, provide documentation, receive 
and evaluate submissions, and negotiate and award contracts, such as P3 agreements. FAQs: 
Alternative Financing and Procurement (AFP), INFRASTRUCTURE ONTARIO, 
http://www.infrastructureontario.ca/AFP-FAQs/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
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reviews all transactional documents submitted by the private bidders, 
and attends all informational meetings where public authorities 
evaluate the submissions. The fairness auditor or monitor gives its 
opinions about the openness and fairness of the competitive bidding 
process from start to finish. This position, therefore, represents an 
internal mechanism in the procurement process to promote open and 
fair competition for public projects. The method of evaluating bids in 
the procurement process includes: 
• RFQ; 
• RFP; and 
• Closing—P3 Agreement. 
The RFQ markets the P3 to the public by encouraging participation 
and competition. It invites qualified bidders to make formal, detailed 
submissions for a P3 project. Here, the public authority announces the 
P3 project to attract prospective bidders and evaluates whether the 
private bidder is capable of meeting technical and financial 
requirements. The public authority asks the bidders to give disclosures 
on the following: design, construction, financing, operation, and 
maintenance. RFQ submissions include a list of all proponents 
(corporations or individuals), evaluation scores, reference checks, 
confidential documents, any conflict of interest issues, and a review of 
all financial submissions for compliance with P3 guidelines. The RFQ 
stage has an evaluation team review the submissions, produce an 
evaluation score, and brief the steering committee on its findings. The 
evaluation team can then prepare clarification questions for the project 
manager, who can review final submissions to eventually make 
recommendations. Thus, the RFQ’s purpose is to ensure compliance 
with strict P3 standards set by a public authority. 
The RFP is a method of shortlisting the bidders (from the RFQ stage) 
to present their technical and financial proposals, including the project 
concept, technology, and method of delivery. An evaluation team 
reviews the submissions to confirm specifics of the project, to complete 
reference checks, and to possibly conduct site investigations to allow 
proponents to assess the technical aspects of the site. The RFP allows 
bidders to review and comment on the draft P3 agreement. In the end, 
a winning bidder is chosen to complete the P3 project. Compared to the 
traditional procurement process, P3 procurement is faster and more 
ZAIDI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2018  11:30 AM 
148 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19, 131 
efficient. Each jurisdiction has its own time frame for RFPs and 
RFQs—such processes vary in length of completion.31 
Canada has the one of the fastest procurement processes in the world 
for public infrastructure projects, averaging sixteen to eighteen months 
(compared to three years in the UK).32 The Conference Board of 
Canada noted the following: “Overall, the majority of interviewees 
concurred with the literature that P3 projects do result in projects that 
are more speedily delivered than their traditional procurement 
counterparts.”33 Indeed, the quick delivery of an asset has to do with 
streamlined, regulatory discipline in P3s, particularly with project 
bundling.34 The rigorous nature of the P3 procurement stages (by way 
of RFQs and RFPs) encourages informed disclosure, financial and 
technical assessments, and testing, along with innovative and critical 
thinking among private partners to design and apply a project. 
P3s are comprehensive, open and fair, and so allow for the 
development of unique project characteristics, which is essential for 
projects like HSR. Both the public authority and private partner can see 
the entire project from start to finish, and not dwell only on certain 
stages of development (as seen with traditional procurement). Rather, 
it facilitates clear strategies and addresses questions or concerns for 
each entity early in the planning process, until the end and beyond. To 
 
31 See generally RESPONDING TO GOVERNMENT RFPS: A PROPONENT GUIDE TO THE 
REVISED REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS (RFP) CORPORATE TEMPLATE FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 5 (Apr. 2016), https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov 
/government/services-for-government-and-broader-public-sector/buy-goods-services-and-
construction/how-to-buy-services/proponents_guide_to_responding_to_rfps.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2018). Confidentiality of all communications between the interested parties 
is preserved in meetings, where confidentiality undertakings are signed by such parties to 
avoid public disclosure. See Management Framework: Procurement Process, ALBERTA 
INFRASTRUCTURE & TRANSPORTATION 28 (Sept. 2006), http://www.infrastructure 
.alberta.ca/Content/doctype309/production/ait-p3-procurementframework.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2018). This means that no project-specific information will be discussed in a public 
place, meetings must be held away from non-project team members, and all external 
communication may not occur between project team members and the general public and 
media. Id. at 30–31. Any member of the public authority found to have a prior relationship 
with any of the project proponents shall be excused from the evaluation process. Id. at 32–
34. 
32 See GILL & DIMICK, supra note 6, at 19. In the city of Winnipeg, the Chief Peguis 
Trail project took only 18.9 months, the city of Edmonton’s Anthony Henday Drive project 
took 14 months, while the city of Calgary’s Stoney Trail project took only 12.5 months. Id. 
at 28. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 For instance, private lenders often impose strict lending terms and conditions upon 
private partners involved in public infrastructure project development. Id. at 13. Such 
conditions include risk assessments and specific mitigation deadlines. Id. 
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support this streamlined process, there is a system of checks and 
balances with an open line of communication to address key issues. 
C. Value for Money (VfM) and Risk Assessments 
Before public authorities contemplate moving forward with any P3 
project, they must compare costs between traditional procurement and 
P3s. This comparison is the VfM analysis. The purpose of the VfM is 
to compare total project costs of traditional procurement (as the public 
comparator) with P3s.35 The difference in costs between these two 
types of projects is the VfM. VfM includes quantitative and qualitative 
measures and risk allocation (e.g., construction costs, scheduling), 
goals and outcomes of the project, payment schedules for the private 
partner, compliance monitoring, information about the winning bidder, 
financial information (total of capital), and technical consultations. The 
important thing is that VfM estimates project costs for the entire 
lifecycle of the project, giving certainty to all interested parties. 
The VfM analysis includes risk assessments because it helps all 
participants see the big picture from start to finish. A risk is defined as 
“any uncertain but quantifiable consequence of an activity,” perceived 
either as costs or benefits.36 Once all project risks are determined, their 
impacts on the projects makes it easier for private bidders to assess their 
own capacity to pursue the project (both technically and financially), 
and for the public authority to determine cost—both direct costs of 
capital, legal, and technical expenditures, as well as administrative and 
overhead expenses.37 In a standard P3 transportation project, common 
sources of risk include: land acquisition, fluctuating design, 
construction and operations costs, encashment costs (for ensuring that 
users pay), complications from public access concerns, budgetary 
 
35 DAWN BIDNE ET AL., THE VALUE OF MONEY ANALYSIS 4, http://www.ncppp.org /wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/PS-051012ValueForMoney-paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
The Value for Money (VfM) uses assumptions about the future economy, probability risk 
assessment, financial modeling, and sensitivity analysis. Id. at 9. Risk modeling software is 
often used to assess risks, where risks are quantified by formulas. Id. at 10. 
36 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSP. INFRASTRUCTURE INV.−OPTIONS 
FOR EFFICIENCY 121 (2008), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/pdfs/infrastructure_report 
_070625.pdf. 
37 CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS: A GUIDE FOR MUNICIPALITIES 17, 27, http://www.p3canada.ca/~/media 
/english/resources-library/files/p3%20guide%20for%20municipalities.pdf (last visited Jan. 
14, 2018). 
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complexities, uncertainty arising from changing policies and laws, 
environmental roadblocks, unpredictable weather events, and variances 
in utility fees, relocation costs, and interest rates.38 
There are also site risks (regarding roadblocks arising from historical 
and environmental restrictions or from general suitability), demand 
risks, asset ownership contracts, and industrial relations. Once these 
risks are determined, the public authorities can transfer the risks to the 
private sector. Here, the private partner accepts the risks based on their 
own area of expertise, reiterating why evaluations of qualified bidders 
is so important. Assessing risks of a P3 project includes VfM, which is 
an overall financial assessment of the procurement process for a 
specific project.39 
In P3s, payment is withheld by the public authority until the private 
partner delivers the asset.40 Such payments are called “availability 
payments,” where the private partner is paid by completing the project, 
and then maintaining its operation for public use.41 That is, the private 
partner does not receive payment up and until completion of the public 
project—payment to them is based on availability and use of the public 
service (e.g., direct user fees or road tolling). The payment reimburses 
capital expenditures incurred by the private partner. So, the private 
partner can expect revenue flows because the public asset is long-term 
in nature. 
Managerial control is given to the private partner. Alexandersson 
and Hultén noted that in P3s: “[T]here is a general consensus that 
 
38 See CITY OF EDMONTON, OFFICE OF THE CITY AUDITOR, P3 BENEFITS AND RISKS 6–
7, 9–12, (June 9, 2008) https://www.edmonton.ca/city_government/documents/PDF/08 
246_P3_Benefits_and_Risks.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
39 According to the UK Treasury, VfM is defined as “the optimum combination of whole-
of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s 
requirement.” It is not the lowest cost of the project. See generally Matti Siemiatycki, Is 
There a Distinctive Canadian PPP Model? Reflections on Twenty Years of Practice, CBS-
SAUDER-MONASH 7-8 (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.sauder.ubc.ca/Faculty/Research 
_Centres/Phelps_Centre_for_the_Study_of_Government_and_Business/Events/UBC_P3 
_Conference/~/media/Files/Faculty%20Research/Phelps%20Centre/2013%20P3%20Con 
ference/Papers/s6%20%20Siemiatycki%20Is%20There%20a%20Distinctive.as hx. 
40 PPP CANADA, About P3s: Frequently Asked Questions−How do P3s Work?, 
http://www.p3canada.ca/en/about-p3s/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Jan. 12, 
2018). 
41 XINYUAN ZHU & QINGBIN CUI, AVAILABILITY PAYMENT DESIGN IN PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP, https://www.pomsmeetings.org/confpapers/051/051-1218.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2018). See also PAMELA BAILEY-CAMPBELL, AVAILABILITY PAYMENTS: WHAT 
CAN WE LEARN FROM SURFACE TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS?, LEIGHFISHER, http://aci-
na.org/sites/default/files/pamela_campbell.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
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private firms are better than the public sector to manage construction 
and market risk and project time—if they are in charge of a project.”42 
Private partners already have expertise in dealing with public projects. 
Their interest is based on the long-term delivery of the public asset‒–
they know it will generate revenue with public use. Therefore, the 
flexible P3 arrangement encourages partners to provide capital 
investment into projects. This is why most public infrastructure 
projects in Canada are completed by the private sector.43 
D. P3 Agreements 
A P3 agreement is a set of terms and conditions between public and 
private entities to build public assets.44 It outlines key technical, legal, 
and financial issues that arise during the procurement process, and 
addresses all performance standards during each stage of development. 
Some essential clauses in a P3 agreement include: 
• TERM 
 ° Duration of the P3 project (from design and building to 
construction and operations/maintenance)—usually long-term 
(twenty to forty years) 
• FINANCING 
 ° The private partner must secure adequate financing (e.g., debt 
financing) 
• DUTIES 
 ° The duties of the private partner are set out: 
 
42 Alexandersson & Hultén, supra note 13, at 101. 
43 Approximately eighty-five percent of public assets are delivered by the private sector. 
See generally GILL & DIMICK, supra note 6, at 34. 
44 In the context of public asset developments, there are four types of P3 contracts: (1) 
divestments of public property or businesses to the private sector; (2) greenfield investments 
(e.g., toll motorways); (3) service contracts that include promises on investments; and (4) 
concessions, licenses, and franchise agreements (ten to thirty years). Alexandersson & 
Hultén, supra note 13, at 98. Standard clauses in a P3 agreement include: (1) 
Term/Concession; (2) Regulatory Review (Procurement); (3) Stages of Development 
(Design/Construction/Completion); (4) Payments; (5) Labour; (6) Financing; (7) 
Insurance/Indemnification; (8) Representations/Warranties; (9) Default/ Remedies; (10) 
Intellectual Property; (11) Assignment/Transfer; (12) Termination; and (13) Dispute 
Resolution. See Matthew R. Alter et al., Construction and Projects in Canada: Overview, 
PRACTICAL LAW COUNTRY Q&A (Sept. 1, 2016), https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters 
.com/Document/I020626ed1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?origination 
Context=knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextData=(sc.Default)&first 
Page=true&bhcp=1. 
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 ♦ Complete the design and building of the project by a deadline 
  ♦  Finance (or partially finance) building of the project (over the 
contract’s term) 
  ♦ Operations/maintenance and rehabilitation services for the 
project to comply with quality and performance standards 
• QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
 ° The private partner must fulfill quality of design, materials, and 
technology, and perform to meet the standards set by the public 
authority 
• PAYMENTS 
 ° Once the project is completed and open to the public, the public 
authority begins making installment (monthly) payments to the 
private bidder 
• PENALTIES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE (BREACH) 
 ° If the private partner fails to deliver the public asset by a 
deadline, or fails to meet technical requirements, severe 
penalties are assessed and enforced—often as reductions in 
monthly capital payments 
• REVERSION 
 ° Ownership of the project reverts back to the public authority, 
but operations/maintenance continues by the private partner. 
There are clauses for “quality and performance monitoring.” Here, 
independent consultants and committees representing the public 
authority oversee the design and building of the project to ensure safety 
and quality are observed by the private partner.45 This ensures the 
public sector receives value throughout the P3 term. An example of 
quality and performance monitoring is in Alberta, where the Treasury 
Board requires the procurement agency to publish a P3 project report 
within six months after executing the P3 agreement.46 Such procedures 
allow the proponents to discuss terms and conditions in the P3 
agreement. Final submissions from participants are reviewed for their 
completeness and compliance with procurement guidelines.47 
 
45 ALBERTA TREASURY BOARD, ALBERTA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
FRAMEWORK & GUIDELINE 20–21, 24 (Mar. 2011), www.infrastructure.alberta.ca/Alberta 
-P3-Framework-and-Guideline.docx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018). 
46 Lindsay McGlashan, Public-Private Partnerships: Are Canadians Getting the Full 
Picture?, 2015-50-E LIBR. OF PARLIAMENT IN BRIEF 5 (June 26, 2015), http://www 
.lop.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2015-50-e.html?cat=economics. 
47 ALBERTA TREASURY BOARD, supra note 45, at 70. 
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If targets are not met, the private partner is penalized.48 Conversely, 
if the partner meets targets (and beyond), it is paid the full fee—a 
healthy incentive. Thus, payment to the private partner is tied to 
compliance monitoring of the public asset. The P3 agreement also 
contains clauses for financial incentives, such as payment structures 
and tax credits. These include payments structured as: (1) yearly 
payments; (2) availability payments (based on performance standards 
and milestones); or (3) concessions (based on user fees from ticket 
prices and track access charges).49 The P3 agreement ends upon 
completion of the public project, and the asset reverts back to the 
government.50 So, P3s do not represent the outright privatization of a 
public asset—eventually the public asset becomes public. The private 
partner never owns the public asset—it has a license to keep the asset 
during the term of the P3 project. Even partial payments are made to 
the private partner upon substantial performance or completion of the 
project. P3 agreements are not structured instantly. Rather, the contract 
is negotiated throughout the lifecycle of the project—from the 
beginning of the procurement process, well into the stages of 
development.51 This provides comprehensiveness and flexibility in that 
private partners can adapt to the surrounding circumstances. 
V 
MUNICIPAL P3S AND POLICIES 
If there is any possibility to develop HSR in Canada, one must 
consider the role of municipalities. Municipalities play a large role in 
P3s for transportation projects, guided by the provincial procurement 
 
48 Charles Lammam, Hugh MacIntyre & Joseph Berechman, Using Public Private 
Partnerships to Improve Transportation Infrastructure in Canada iv (May 30, 2013), 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/using-public-private-partnerships-to-improve-trans 
portation-infrastructure-canada (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
49 Silviu Dochia & Michael Parker, Introduction to Public-Private Partnerships with 
Availability Payments, JEFFREY A. PARKER & ASSOCS., INC. 1, http://www.pwfinance.net 
/document/research_reports/9%20intro%20availability.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). See 
also AON INFRASTRUCTURE SOLUTIONS, PAYMENT MECHANISM: THE FIRST FORM OF 
RISK TRANSFER IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 1 (Sept. 2014), http://www.aon.com 
/attachments/risk-services/AIS_Payment-Mechanism-White-Paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 
2018). 
50 CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 37, at 7. 
51 ALBERTA TREASURY BOARD, supra note 45, at 43, 44. 
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process to fit their local interests.52 Municipalities also receive 
provincial and federal P3 funding, which means that all levels of 
government coordinate in public asset development.53 The responsible 
public authority (federal or provincial) usually works with 
municipalities to “project bundle”—municipalities may not have the 
finances and resources to merge all stages of development on 
designated projects.54 Municipal P3s are directly funded by the federal 
P3 Canada Fund, a method to encourage municipalities to engage in 
project bundling.55 The direct funding of municipalities for P3s allows 
municipalities to better manage all stages of development, particularly 
the operation and maintenance stages. 
A promising aspect of municipal P3s is light rail transit (LRT) 
projects. Since LRT projects are similar to HSR in design, planning, 
technology, resources, and delivery, P3s may be a sensible choice. This 
does not suggest that public authorities should superimpose LRT P3s 
with HSR P3s. Rather, the P3 should be tailored to HSR issues. Since 
high-speed trains would link between municipalities as part of a larger, 
regional hub that promotes transportation sustainability and economic 
development (by way of tourism and business convenience), the scale 
of development will be broader. To meet this logistical challenge, P3s 
can be used for HSR development because they will coordinate all 
levels of government (and the private sector) to combine their financial, 
technical, and legal resources. In this sense, it is highly unlikely that 
traditional procurement can achieve this objective. 
Municipal P3 policies and bylaws are fully supported by the federal 
P3 agency (PPP Canada) in promoting adaptive strategies to help 
municipalities in building public infrastructure. PPP Canada provides 
twenty-five percent funding (through the P3 Canada Fund), as well as 
 
52 Municipalities generally fall below $60 million for P3 projects, but transportation-
related P3s cost more. See generally GILL & DIMICK, supra note 6, at 44. 
53 In Canadian constitutional law, intraprovincial matters (local works) fall under 
provincial jurisdiction under section 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act (1867), while 
interprovincial regulation of trade and commerce matters fall under section 91(2) of the 
same Act. Joseph Magnet, Residuary and Emergency Powers, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
CANADA, http://www.constitutional-law.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti 
cle&id=15&Itemid=29 (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
54 CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, P3 PROJECT BUNDLING 
ROUNDTABLE BRIEFING, https://www.pppcouncil.ca/web/pdf/briefing-paper-p3-bundling 
.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). See, e.g., Don Wall, Massive Saskatchewan Project 
Highlighted as P3 Bundling Success, J. COMMERCE, https://canada.constructconnect.com 
/joc/news/projects/2017/11/massive-saskatchewan-project-highlighted-as-p3-bundling-suc 
cess-1028517w (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
55 CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 37, at 18. 
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expert advisory services and consultants, to assist municipalities 
(particularly jurisdictions inexperienced with P3s) in building complex 
transportation projects.56 Indeed, there is an increasing number of 
Canadian municipalities adopting P3 policies and guidelines. For 
instance, the cities of Calgary, Edmonton, St. Albert, Regina, 
Winnipeg, and Ottawa have their own P3 policies and bylaws. 
In 2008, the city of Calgary adopted P3 policies that provide that: 
(1) the public interest is paramount; (2) public control must be 
preserved; (3) accountability must be maintained; (4) the project is a 
public priority; (5) the P3 procurement process must be competitive, 
transparent, equitable, and timely; and (6) the P3 delivery model must 
provide best VfM over the project life cycle, considering risk transfer, 
innovation and community issues.57 In 2010, the city of Edmonton 
created P3 policies that suggest the following: (1) deliver improved 
services through best allocation of risks, rewards, and resources; (2) 
create clear outcomes; (3) leverage private sector expertise and 
innovation through competitive and transparent process; (4) create 
certainty of costs, schedule, and quality; and (5) the P3 shall apply to 
large-scale public infrastructure projects.58 Overall, both cities reflect 
their emphasis on promoting open, fair, and competitive P3 
procurements that serve the public interest in giving certainty and 
meeting clear objectives. 
Such policies and bylaws provide a set of best practices to ensure a 
streamlined P3 procurement process. They also ensure project 
governance with accurate upfront planning, even with private sector 
involvement.59 Thus, for complex P3s (like HSR), municipalities are 
poised for development with support of a federal regulatory 
framework. This federally-funded municipal framework means the 
transfer of enough risks to the private sector by adopting a whole life 
cycle approach (project bundling), paying based on performance, and 
specifying what the municipality wants for the project. 
 
56 PPP Canada, P3 Canada Fund, http://www.p3canada.ca/en/p3-canada-fund/the-p3-
canada-fund/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). 
57 CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 37, at 69. 
58 Id. 
59 The city of Edmonton has a Governance Board, consisting of government and private 
experts to oversee its upcoming LRT project. John McBride, Municipal P3s: Exploring the 
Success Factors (Apr. 2014), https://www.publicsectordigest.com/article/municipal-p3s-ex 
ploring-success-factors. 
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Figure 2: Detailed Procurement Process using P3s 
 
 
 
 
VI 
CANADIAN EXAMPLES OF P3S FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
To build HSR in Canada, it is necessary to draw from successful P3s 
in roadways and LRT. Three noteworthy examples are: (1) Edmonton’s 
Anthony Henday Ring Road, (2) Edmonton’s ValleyLine LRT, and (3) 
Winnipeg’s Chief Peguis Trail Extension. These examples reveal how 
P3s helped build major roadways and a LRT system, showing the true 
value of the P3 model. 
A. Edmonton’s Anthony Henday Ring Road 
In January 2005, the city of Edmonton announced a P3 project for a 
major roadway to relieve traffic congestion in the southeast portion of 
the city with a ring road consisting of eleven kilometers of highway, 
twenty-four bridges, and five interchanges.60 This represents one of 
Canada’s first major municipal P3 projects to build a motorway. This 
$493 million CAD project is a thirty-three year design-build-finance-
 
60 The project, called the Anthony Henday Drive, covers eleven kilometers of a four and 
six-lane motorway, built with crossroads, access roads, five interchanges, and twenty-four 
bridges. Press Release, Gov’t of Alberta, P3 Enables Anthony Henday Drive S.E. to Open 
in 2007 (Jan. 25, 2005), https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=17518283FCDE1  -8C4E-
4EB3-A93F13E86CE3C94F. 
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operate (DBFO) type of P3 arrangement (reversion in 2046).61 The 
public authority, Alberta Infrastructure and Transportation (AIT) 
signed a P3 agreement in 2005 with a private consortium, Access 
Roads Edmonton Ltd. (AREL).62 The procurement process only had a 
seventeen month timeline after the initial Request for Qualification 
(RFQ).63 The RFQ was issued globally to see which companies were 
capable of working on the project. 
As such, the procurement process had three pre-qualified bidders 
who then completed a highway design, pricing plan, and financing 
plan. In the interim, a P3 agreement was negotiated with the bidders 
prior to finalizing the proposals. The consortium clearly stated the level 
of risk transfer and availability payments and helped avoid significant 
delays in pursuing the motorway project. From start to finish, the entire 
P3 project was completed in less than two years.64 
The P3 was advantageous because the initial capital costs for the 
roadway were financed by a private consortium, which meant no public 
spending occurred until completion of the project. 
 
 
 
 
 
61 CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS: A PAN-CANADIAN 
ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS 48 
(Jan. 2010), http://www.partnershipsbc.ca/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Conference -
Board-of-Canada-Report-Dispelling-the-Myths-DispellingTheMythsRpt_WEB.pdf. See 
also Press Release, Government of Alberta (Jan. 25, 2005), 
https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=17518283FCDE1-8C4E-4EB3-A93F13E86CE3 
C94F (last updated Jan. 28, 2005). 
62 CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, supra note 61, at 47. 
63 ALBERTA TRANSPORTATION, REQUEST FOR QUALIFICATION FOR THE DESIGN, 
BUILD, FINANCE, OPERATE OF ANTHONY HENDAY DRIVE 10–18, http://www.transpor 
tation.alberta.ca/Content/docType353/Production/AHD_RFQ.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
64 The dates are as follows: (1) September 2003 (RFQ was issued); (2) March 2004 (three 
teams selected to submit proposals); (3) November 2004 (final proposal submission); (4) 
December 2004 (lowest bidder chosen); (5) January 2004 (P3 contract signed). See Press 
Release, supra note 60. 
Project: 
Anthony 
Henday Ring 
Road
• P3 Model: DBFOM (Design-Build-
Finance-Operate/Maintain)
• P3 Agreement: 34.5 years
• Delivery of Asset: 3 years earlier
• Cost Savings: $371 million
• Date Completed: October 1, 2016
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B. Edmonton’s Valley Line LRT 
The Valley Line LRT project represents a good example of how a 
P3 helped build a municipal LRT project. The plan connects the 
southeast portion of Edmonton to the west end, with an estimated daily 
ridership of 28,000 passengers.65 This project is set as a design-build-
finance-operate/maintain (DBFOM) model, and has a 4.8-year 
construction period from February 2016 to December 2020. The public 
authority includes the city of Edmonton, the province of Alberta, and 
the Canadian government. The private partner chosen was TransEd 
Partners, a consortium consisting of equity investors, lenders,66 design 
and construction firms, and operations/maintenance firms. 
The city of Edmonton applied to P3 Canada (federal agency) for 
partial funding because the Valley Line project is designated as “public 
transit infrastructure.”67 Edmonton’s application to P3 Canada shows 
how municipalities integrate with the federal P3 framework, and how 
strong federal funding supports municipalities. Eventually, P3 Canada 
awarded $400 million, but only for the construction of the southeast 
portion of the LRT line. A crucial component of this project was public 
consultation. In 2009, affected communities, citizens, and businesses 
provided feedback, which the city of Edmonton relayed to the private 
partner.68 This suggests an open and fair process outside of the 
procurement process, normally subjected to private bidders, where the 
ultimate design of the LRT line reflects community feedback. 
 
65 The project also includes the construction of a bridge, a 350-meter tunnel, and an 
operations/maintenance facility for the new line. About P3s: Edmonton Light Rail Transit 
System (Edmonton, AB), Project Description, http://www.p3canada.ca/en/about-p3s/pro 
ject-map/edmonton-light-rail-transit-system/ (last visited June 10, 2017). It is estimated that 
the daily ridership for this line shall increase to 49,000 passengers by 2044. Id. The timeline 
for this project was as follows: in 2011, a recommendation of the P3 method was made to 
Edmonton City Council; in 2012, City Council approved a funding strategy to expand LRT 
from Millwoods (southeast) to Lewis Farms (west end). CITY OF EDMONTON, VALLEY LINE 
LRT, STAGE 1 BETWEEN DOWNTOWN AND MILLWOODS 5, https://www.edmonton.ca 
/documents/RoadsTraffic/valley_line_lrt_booklet.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). The first 
part of this line will connect the southeast with downtown—around 13.2 kilometers or 8 
miles. Id. 
66 The lenders include Bank of Nova Scotia, Royal Bank of Canada, and Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking Corporation. KPMG, VALLEY LINE LRT - STAGE 1: VALUE FOR MONEY 
REPORT CITY OF EDMONTON (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.p3canada.ca/~/media/english 
/resources-library/files/valleyline-valueformoneyreportapril%202016.pdf.  
67 VALLEY LINE LRT, STAGE 1, supra note 65, at 1–10. 
68 Id. at 5. 
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The VfM identified several risks to help estimate costs.69 The city of 
Edmonton’s P3 policies requires performance standards to be met for 
all stages of development in a public project.70 Any failure to deliver 
the public asset on time and on budget reduces the return for the private 
partner and holds the private partner accountable for failing to meet 
minimum performance standards.71 The Valley Line LRT project 
remains with the city of Edmonton as a reversionary interest; the 
private partner is only given a license for the term of the P3 agreement 
to design, build, operate and maintain it.72 The P3 agreement outlined 
specific duties for both the public authority and private partner.73 The 
private partner finances a portion of the design and building costs, 
including testing the facilities.74 It must supply light rail vehicles and 
maintain and rehabilitate services over the thirty-year period.75 The 
public authority makes payments during the construction and operating 
period in a timely manner.76 It must install all ticket vending machines, 
monitor the performance of the private partner, and provide security 
services and signage.77 
 
 
69 KPMG, supra note 66, at 19–21 (Risks included design, LRT vehicle supply and 
infrastructure, land acquisition, utility relocation, Gerry Wright Operations, ticket vending 
machines, bus infrastructure, environmental permits, contamination, geotechnical site 
conditions, roadway signals, landscaping, snow removal, energy, and financing.). 
70 VALLEY LINE LRT, STAGE 1, supra note 65, at 17. 
71 CITY OF EDMONTON, PROJECT AGREEMENT, VALLEY LINE LRT STAGE 1 27, 
https://www.edmonton.ca/documents/RoadsTraffic/Project%20Agreement%20Valley%20
Line%20LRT.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
72 Id. at 6, 76. 
73 See id. at 1–37. 
74 Id. at 7–8. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
Project: 
Valley Line 
LRT 
• P3 Model: DBFOM (Design-Build-
Finance-Operate/Maintain)
• P3 Agreement: 34.5 years
• Delivery of Asset: To be determined
• Cost Savings: 3 to 10 percent
• Date Completed: 2020
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The Valley Line LRT project serves as the closest P3 model to HSR 
development. If all levels of government work with a qualified private 
consortium to create an LRT system, and if there is a comprehensive 
P3 agreement covering train-related issues, then it is likely possible to 
create a similar HSR project. It is merely a matter of extending LRT 
projects to a larger scale. 
C. Winnipeg’s Chief Peguis Trail Extension 
Winnipeg’s Chief Peguis Trail Extension is another successful P3. 
The $127.9 million project added ten kilometers to a major roadway, 
and used a design, build, finance (DBF) model.78 It was also completed 
much earlier than anticipated and funded by three sources—the federal 
P3 Canada Fund, the Province of Manitoba, and the City of Winnipeg.79 
The RFQ was issued on February 27, 2009.80 Later, three prospective 
bidders were chosen and the RFP was issued in September 2009.81 The 
RFP identified the winning consortium as DBF2 Limited Partnership, 
consisting of seven companies.82 The P3 agreement was signed on 
September 17, 2010, and a public consultation was later held in March 
2011, with members of the private consortium present to answer 
questions about the project.83 
The project officially opened on December 2, 2011, took only thirty-
three months to complete and finished one year ahead of schedule.84 
Overall, this P3 project saved $31 million, a large amount compared to 
same public project engaged in the traditional procurement model.85 
The fairness advisor confirmed that the P3 procurement process was 
open, fair, and competitive.86 The Chief Peguis Trail Extension 
 
78 City of Winnipeg Public Works, Chief Peguis Trail Extension West, http://www 
.winnipeg.ca/publicworks/construction/projects/chiefpeguiswest.stm#tab-documents (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018). See also BRUCE BIGLOW, CHIEF PEGUIS TRAIL: P3 CONSTRUCTION 
5 (June 2012), http://conf.tac-atc.ca/english/annualconference/tac2012/docs/session6/big 
low.pdf. 
79 BIGLOW, supra note 78. 
80 Id. 
81 Chief Peguis Trail Extension Project - Phase 1 Complete, WINNIPEG PUBLIC WORKS 
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.winnipeg.ca/publicworks/construction/pastProjects/chief 
PeguisTrail/procurement.stm (The RFQ closing date was May 11, 2009). 
82 BIGLOW, supra note 78. 
83 Id. 
84 PPP Canada, About P3s: Chief Peguis Trail Extension, http://www.p3canada.ca/en 
/about-p3s/project-map/chief-peguis-trail-extension/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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succeeded because of project bundling, which allowed for early 
construction, identification of risks transferring from the public 
authority to the private partner consortium, and making the 
procurement process open, fair, and efficient. The advantage of project 
bundling is that all stages of development for the P3 project are merged 
into one comprehensive plan. This created certainty for the private 
consortium, as clear tasks were set along the way. Project bundling 
united all three levels of government to achieve its goal of building a 
major public roadway for Winnipeg to relieve traffic congestion. 
 
 
 
VII 
INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF P3S IN HSR−NETHERLANDS, 
TAIWAN, AND CALIFORNIA 
Venturing into new territory for projects like HSR requires one to 
draw from international P3 experiences, particularly in nations using 
HSR. What lessons can be learned from such nations? Surveying the 
literature, it appears that the results for P3s are mixed for HSR 
development. Two jurisdictions with negative P3 experiences, 
Netherlands and Taiwan, teach what to avoid in future HSR 
developments, while California demonstrates a positive experience 
with its current development of HSR.87 These findings also suggest that 
P3s are not a panacea in themselves––they must be tailored to HSR 
 
87 TONY DUTZIK ET AL., HIGH-SPEED RAIL: PUBLIC, PRIVATE OR BOTH?: ASSESSING 
THE PROSPECTS, PROMISE, AND PITFALLS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, U.S. PIRG 
EDUCATION FUND 2 (July 19, 2011), http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/HSR-
PPP-USPIRG-July-19-2011.pdf. For instance, one commentator noted that: “[t]he 
experience with high-speed rail PPPs around the world, however, has been mixed. While 
PPP arrangements have brought private capital and expertise to the task of building high-
speed rail, PPPs have also resulted in cost overruns, government bailouts, and other serious 
problems for the public.” Id. at 1. 
Project: Chief 
Peguis Trail 
Extension
• P3 Model: DBFM (Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain)
• P3 Agreement: 30 years
• Delivery of Asset: 1 year earlier
• Cost Savings: $31 million
• Date Completed: December 2, 2011
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issues. Even so, the P3 approach is becoming a fresh alternative in 
helping build new, innovative public works like HSR. From these 
comparative P3 perspectives, we can assemble the raw ingredients to 
synthesize a P3 procurement process to build HSR in Canada.88 
A. Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a high-speed rail known as the HSL-Zuid Line, 
a 125-km track linking Amsterdam and Rotterdam to Belgium.89 The 
public owner is the Dutch Ministry of Transport, while the private 
operator is NS Hispeed (NS and KLM).90 There are three components 
to the project: (1) building of the substructure (tunnels, bridges, and 
concrete slabs) by civil contractors; (2) giving the superstructure to the 
Infraspeed Consortium to design, build, finance, operate and maintain 
the system’s tracks, stations, and signaling for twenty-five years; and 
(3) operations.91 Built in 2007 and beginning operations in 2009, the 
HSL-Zuid Line project was based mostly on public funds, with only 
fourteen percent drawn from private investment.92 For speed and 
efficiency, the Dutch government divided the P3 agreement into eight 
packages with various civil contractors for the design and construction 
phases. 
The project required the consortium to handle signaling systems, 
traction and power supply, command and control systems, ancillary 
 
88 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 45 (Those EU member states with 
the most comprehensive P3 legislation are Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Finland, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Turkey.). 
See generally AKINTOLA AKINTOYE, MATHIAS BECK, & MOHAN KUMARASWAMY, PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS−A GLOBAL REVIEW (Routledge ed., 2015). 
89 High Speed Railway Operated by Nederlandse Spoorwegen, RAILWAY TECHNOLOGY, 
https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/zuid/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
90 OMEGA CENTRE, UCL PROJECT PROFILE: NETHERLANDS HSL-ZUID 7 (2014), 
http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NETHERLANDS 
_HSL_ZUID_PROFILE.pdf (last visited June 7, 2017). The objectives of the HSL-Zuid 
were: (1) link the ports of Rotterdam, Schiphol, and Amsterdam to the Trans European 
Network of high-speed trains; (2) boost economic development; (3) reduce car traffic; and 
(4) have trains travel at 300 km/h. Id. at 20. In 2006, the total cost of the project was 
estimated at €6.9 billion (Euro). High Speed Railway Operated by Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen, supra note 89. 
91 AECOM, HIGH SPEED RAIL STUDY: PHASE 2 REPORT 83 (Mar. 2013), 
https://infrastructure.gov.au/rail/trains/high_speed/files/HSR_Phase_2_Appendix_Group_
7_Procurement_institutional_appraisal_and_implementation_plan.pdf. This P3 project was 
maintained by the High Speed Alliance, ninety percent owned by the Dutch state railway 
(NS), with ten percent owned by Air France-KLM in a joint venture. DUTZIK ET AL., supra 
note 87, at 10. 
92 DUTZIK ET AL., supra note 87, at 23. 
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equipment, telecommunications, rail track, noise barriers, and 
easement (right of way) fencing. The P3 agreement was signed for a 
thirty-year period. Here, Infraspeed was obligated to build the line for 
the first five years and maintain it for the remaining twenty-five years.93 
An interesting feature of the P3 agreement was its Requirement 
Compliance Matrix, containing 585 requirements before the 
consortium could obtain a Certificate of Availability.94 
Critical mistakes were made throughout the P3 project. First, during 
the substructure phase the Dutch government was unable to transfer 
sufficient risks to the private sector, which resulted in the government 
using the traditional procurement model. Second, the Dutch 
government relied on the winners of three contract bids for three 
separate projects to communicate with one another, without 
administrative oversight to ensure compliance with P3 standards. 
Third, the bids for the substructure were up to forty-three percent 
higher than anticipated, as Infraspeed’s project bid was based on 
engineering designs that changed during the bidding process. A lack of 
competition in the Dutch construction market, along with collusional 
bidding among the consortia also contributed to higher bids. The higher 
costs required the Dutch government to cut back on the designs and 
seek lower bids by eliminating penalties against late completion of the 
substructure (something that ordinarily disciplines a private partner 
under a standard P3). Fourth, there was not one public authority 
governing the P3, but two administrative agencies overlooking the 
entire project with various contractors. The contractors failed to 
communicate among themselves as to the specifics of the project. 
Overall, these errors contributed to the total costs of the HSL-Zuid Line 
project being fifty-five percent more than projected.95 
The Dutch HSR project highlights some negative aspects of P3s. 
First, project bundling was not used to merge all stages of development. 
Rather, three separate stages of the project were planned, resulting in 
the negotiation of three separate agreements by various consortia. 
Miscommunication between the interested parties led to costlier bids, 
 
93 Global Railway Review, HSL-Zuid: High Speed Importance, https://www.globalrail 
wayreview.com/article/850/hsl-zuid-high-speed-importance/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
94 Editorial, Contractors Hurry to Finish HSL-Zuid, RAILWAY GAZETTE (Apr. 1, 2005), 
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/contractors-hurry-to-finish-hsl-
zuid.html. Several of these requirements included safety and speed testing. Id. 
95 Global Railway Review, supra note 93. See also High Speed Line Zuid, BAM PPP, 
https://www.bamppp.com/en/our-projects/high-speed-line-zuid (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
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cost overruns, delays, and unnecessary assumption of the risk by state 
authorities that would typically be borne by the private sector. 
Second, collusion of bids suggested a lack of transparency in the 
competitive bidding process. This led to reduced cost savings. 
Third, only one public authority should have overseen the project to 
consolidate efforts and strategies, while avoiding technical mistakes 
such as changing designs during the bidding process. 
Fourth, there was no smooth transfer of risks in the HSR project 
from the public authority to the private partner. 
B. Taiwan 
Another example of P3 challenges is Taiwan’s high-speed rail 
network.96 Construction of the project began in February 2000 after 
Taiwan enacted its Act for Promotion of Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Projects.97 The purpose of the law was to encourage P3s 
in Taiwan’s public infrastructure development.98 
In January 1997, procurement began for a high-speed rail project 
connecting Taiwan’s two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiun. As part 
of the competitive bidding process, two consortia emerged: Taiwan 
HSR Alliance and China HSR Alliance. Competition focused on 
financing rather than technical issues because of mature HSR 
technology already in place.99 The Chinese group requested that the 
public authority invest $4.5 billion, while the Taiwanese group 
requested nothing.100 
The Taiwanese Government eventually awarded the P3 project to 
the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation (THSRC) in September 
1997.101 The P3 agreement was signed in July 1998, after ten months 
 
96 See DUTZIK ET AL., supra note 87, at 21 (Between 2006 and 2009, the number of 
passengers-miles traveled by train in Taiwan increased by fifty-six percent, while the 
number of passengers on domestic air service decreased by fifty-three percent.). 
97 Public Construction Commission, Act for Promotion of Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Projects (last updated Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.pcc.gov.tw/pccap2 
/BIZSfront/EngMenuContent.do?site=004&bid=BIZS_C00007545. In Taiwan, there were 
985 P3 contracts signed between 2000 and 2012. AKINTOYE ET AL., supra note 88, at 307. 
98 Peter Yu Kien-hong, Near-bankruptcy of the Taiwan High Speed Rail Corp.: What 
Went Wrong?, 5(12) INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 14, 14 (2010), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu 
/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.965.6550&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 4. 
101 PETRA TODOROVICH ET AL., HIGH-SPEED RAIL: INT’L LESSONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
MAKERS, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY 51 (2011), http://www.lincolninst.edu/sites 
/default/files/pubfiles/high-speed-rail-full_0.pdf. 
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of negotiation. A concession period of thirty-five years was agreed 
upon, where the 345-kilometer line was to follow the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) model. The total cost of the project was $18.4 billion 
USD, where $3.4 billion came from the government and $15 billion 
came from the private consortium.102 The private consortium was 
responsible for civil works, train stations, tracks, electrical and 
mechanical systems, and financing. The public authority dealt with 
land acquisitions and supervision of construction. 
Several major problems emerged during the project: lack of 
ridership, indirect government funding, a construction delay of 
fourteen months, and a cost overrun of $1.5 to $1.7 billion.103 The 
THSRC failed to obtain debt financing of $10 billion from its lenders 
after signing the P3 agreement. The public authority did not anticipate 
the debt guarantee, nor was it specified during the procurement process. 
As a result, the THSRC demanded debt financing from the government, 
otherwise it would abandon the project. In response, the public 
authority signed a debt finance agreement worth $10 billion. THSRC 
suffered major financial losses, forcing the Taiwanese government to 
take over the corporation by refinancing its debt and even changing its 
board of directors.104 
The P3 project essentially failed for three reasons. First, the public 
authority ended up providing capital that the private partner in the 
THSRC was supposed to provide. Second, a lock-in occurred, where 
the private partner suffered financial losses (largely due to the Asian 
financial crisis), and could not complete the project. The lock-in meant 
that although the Taiwanese government could have let THSRC go 
bankrupt, it would have resulted in abandonment of the HSR project 
altogether, adversely affecting the public interest. Third, unanticipated 
debt financing problems emerged that led to a government bailout. Due 
to its inexperience with P3 financing, the Taiwanese government did 
 
102 S. Ping Ho, GOV’T POLICY ON PPP FIN. ISSUES: BID COMP. AND FIN. 
RENEGOTIATION 41, https://gpc.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/wp029_0.pdf (last visited 
June 10, 2017). 
103 See generally AECOM AUSTRALIA PTY. LTD., HIGH SPEED RAIL STUDY PHASE TWO 
REPORT 73−75 (Mar. 2013), https://infrastructure.gov.au/rail/trains/high_speed/files 
/HSR_Phase_2_Appendix_Group_7_Procurement_institutional_appraisal_and_implemen 
tation_plan.pdf. 
104 S. Ping Ho, supra note 102, at 43. The corporation lacked financing and thus failed 
to complete the project. See id. 
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not ensure proper financing would be available when negotiating with 
the private partner during the procurement process. 
C. California 
Drawing from the European P3 experience, California became the 
first jurisdiction in the United States to build HSR.105 In 2008, the 
California High Speed Rail Authority (the public authority responsible 
for California’s entire HSR system) issued a Request for Expression of 
Interest (RFEI), after which thirty responses were received from P3 
players from both domestic and international sources. In February 
2009, the California Department of Transportation and regional 
transportation agencies entered into concession agreements with the 
private sector on transportation projects.106 This included concessions 
towards deference for a municipal or local government’s preference for 
P3s. 
In 2010, California created a dedicated P3 office known as the Public 
Infrastructure Advisory Commission (PIAC).107 As the lead P3 agency, 
PIAC advises the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 
and regional transportation agencies on P3s, encouraging P3s for public 
infrastructure development. Consisting of twenty commissioners from 
academia, industry, and government, PIAC reviews proposed projects 
in terms of finances and gives clear objectives and recommendations to 
the private sector on P3s. In 2012, California laid its first HSR tracks 
for an 800-mile HSR system. For this project, $2.3 billion of the 
funding came from P3 investments, twenty-five percent to thirty-three 
percent of funding came from federal funds, and the remaining funding 
came from the state.108 The federal funds are part of a broad federal 
 
105 See About California High-Speed Rail Authority, CAL. HIGH-SPEED RAIL AUTH., 
http://www.hsr.ca.gov/About/ (last visited June 10, 2017). In terms of pressure to build new 
modes of transportation, California’s population is expected to grow. Id. In 2008, 
Proposition 1A for Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act authorized $9.95 
billion in bonds to build HSR in California. Id. 
106 California was one of the first states to authorize P3s in the late 1980s. ALLAN MARKS 
ET AL., MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS 1 (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.milbank.com/images/con 
tent/6/0/606/032309_California_Public_Private_Partnership_Developments.pdf. In 1989, 
California’s Assembly Bill 680 allowed for competitive bidding of four privately financed 
toll-road projects. Id. 
107 EMILIA ISTRATE & ROBERT PUENTES, BROOKINGS-ROCKEFELLER, MOVING 
FORWARD ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 14 (Dec. 2011), https://www.brookings 
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1208_transportation_istrate_puentes.pdf. 
108 CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL AUTHORITY, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL, http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/newsroom/fact%20sheets 
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legislative initiative to stimulate the U.S. economy under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009).109 In 2017, California’s HSR 
development appears to be well underway.110 
D. Stages of P3 Development 
With the elements of P3s in mind, as well as the P3 examples from 
various jurisdictions, the stages for P3 development are as follows: 
• Step 1: Conduct Feasibility Studies 
° Determine the value of using HSR in Canada: 
• Where will HSR be built? 
• What is its impact on society? 
• What are the costs? 
• What are the legal and technical issues? 
° What is the political will to build HSR? 
° Where will HSR be designated? 
• Step 2: Inception−Create a P3 for HSR 
° Outline objectives, expectations, and requirements. 
° Who is the P3 public authority responsible for HSR? 
° Will the public authority use P3s to build HSR? 
° What are the preliminary designs and output specifications? 
• Step 3: Procurement Process 
° Seek out private investors willing to provide capital for HSR 
projects. 
° Invitation for private bidders for HSR project: 
• Ensure that adequate disclosure is made by the private 
partner (e.g., financial statements, details of construction, 
financing, reversion of ownership, etc.); 
 
/Economic_Impact.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). See also CALIFORNIA HIGH SPEED RAIL 
AUTHORITY, HIGH-SPEED RAIL: CONNECTING AND TRANSFORMING CALIFORNIA (June 
2017), http://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/newsroom/fact%20sheets/HSR_Connecting_Factsheet 
.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
109 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1 note (2009). 
110 See generally Operators from Five Countries Interested in California High Speed 
Rail Contract, RAILWAY GAZETTE (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.railwaygazette.com/news 
/single-view/view/operators-from-five-countries-interested-in-california-high-speed-rail     
-contract.html (In April 2017, five responses were received by the California HSR Authority 
to its RFQ, from both domestic and international sources: (1) China HSR ETO Consortium; 
(2) DB International US; (3) FS First Rail Group; (4) RENFE; and (5) Stagecoach Group.). 
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° Public authority engages HSR advisors—legal, technical, 
accounting, finance, project management, risk management. 
° Project Bundling: 
• Creates life cycle of HSR project (merges all stages of 
development); and 
• Creates certainty from start to finish, clearly define the 
tasks, incentives, and goals; 
° Risk Assessments: 
• What are the risks for HSR? 
• What transfer of risks occur from public to private entities? 
• Public authority reviews HSR’s VfM 
 ♦  Is the P3 model preferred over traditional procurement 
for HSR? 
° Does it deliver the best value? 
• Confirmation that private partner can handle risks 
° Which P3 model will be used for HSR? (DBFMO, DBFO, 
DBOT, DBB, DB) 
° Public authority issues the RFQ (Request for Qualification) 
and RFP (Request for Proposal): 
• Private partner responds; 
• Shortlist best candidates (will be invited to respond to 
RFP); 
• RFP is released, showing design, output specifications 
and all other bid documents (including P3 Agreement)—
these are the standards for private partners to follow; 
• Private partner may seek clarifications over its proposals 
(e.g., design); 
• Step 4: Government Chooses Private Partner for P3 
° Private partner may be single entity or consortium 
(construction/engineering firms, lenders, investment 
firms). 
° The most compliant bidder to the RFP is chosen. 
° Contractor will be responsible for design, construction, 
financing, maintenance and operation of the public asset on 
a long-term basis. 
• Step 5: Enter into P3 Agreement 
° Negotiations between public authority and private partner 
on all HSR issues. 
° Provisions should cover all aspects of HSR project. 
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• Step 6: Compliance with P3 Requirements 
° Meeting specific targets and standards. 
° Specific targets include: 
• Construction—design and materials; 
• Handling capacity (ridership) per year; 
• Location of Train Stations (Platforms); 
• Public safety requirements (as set by rail law and 
regulations); 
• Environmental Mitigation—noise and vibration, wildlife 
displacement. 
° Using specifications, the contractor is encouraged to 
provide innovative solutions. 
• This may result in cost savings. 
• Step 7: Payments to Private Partner Based on Performance 
° Government pay the private partner based on meeting 
performance targets: 
• Large upfront costs are paid by the contractor during the 
construction phase. 
° The contractor is paid during the lifetime of the project, 
once it is operational. 
° Two ways to generate profits for private partner: 
• (1) User Fees. 
• Collect fees from tolls. 
• (2) Availability Payments. 
• Government reimburses contractor if the public asset 
meets certain standards or targets (e.g., quality of 
construction, efficiency of operations)—usually as 
fixed fees. 
° If the standards are not met, payments are reduced. 
• Step 8: Construction of HSR Begins 
° Public authority monitors construction progress (based on 
P3 agreement standards). 
° Any changes to the HSR project (e.g., technology) must be 
communicated between the public and private entities. 
• Step 9: Completion of P3 Project 
° P3 Agreement ends. 
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° Public asset in HSR reverts back to the government. 
° Private partner maintains and operates asset (subject to 
monitoring by public authority). 
° HSR becomes a permanent feature of the transportation 
sector. 
VIII 
APPLICATION OF P3 MODEL FOR CANADIAN HSR 
With the above information in mind, let us apply the procedures and 
best practices of P3s to possible HSR development in Canada. The 
premise is that P3s should only be used for HSR if traditional 
procurement is costlier. Some relevant questions should be asked when 
using P3s for HSR in Canada: 
• What is the political will for HSR? 
• What is the private sector’s appetite for investment in HSR? 
• Is the procurement process open, fair, and efficient for private 
bidders? 
• What will the private sector bring to the P3 arrangement, if HSR 
is pursued? 
• What risks will be transferred from public to private entities in 
HSR? 
• Can the private partner handle financing and technical issues for 
HSR? 
• Will project bundling streamline decision-making, add certainty 
in HSR, and deliver the asset on-time? 
Since P3s have been successful in Canada for other forms of public 
transport infrastructure (such as roadways and light rail transit), it is 
conceivable that P3s may help build a new HSR network. As seen from 
international examples, there are already a growing number of P3s in 
the railway sector that serve as guiding principles for HSR 
development.111 As a P3 advocate once stated: “The public sector can 
stretch its investment for more new infrastructure; the private sector 
will utilize best practices to deliver this infrastructure more efficiently 
than traditional methods; and most importantly, each will need to work 
in partnership to ensure the best results for all stakeholders.”112 This 
 
111 DUTZIK ET AL., supra note 87, at 11. 
112 William Marino, Foreword to DAN MCNICHOL, THE UNITED STATES: THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST EMERGING P3 MARKET, https://www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-
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new infrastructure is HSR. To do this, a streamlined, disciplined, and 
tailor-made procurement process is necessary. Because HSR is a new, 
yet long-term public asset, a strong legal framework must complement 
P3s in scope and application. The private partner must see incentives, 
targets, and clear objectives throughout the entire lifecycle of the 
project. This adds certainty in meeting those targets, and confidence 
will grow amongst private investors to participate in HSR, making the 
delivery of HSR easier. At the end of the project, however, the 
ownership of the public HSR asset shall revert to the public authority, 
although operations and maintenance may remain with the private 
partner. 
It is implied that if governments are interested in building HSR, the 
private sector will show interest. This is happening in jurisdictions 
currently building HSR. The benefit for Canada is that the private 
sector is already familiar with Canadian P3s in other public sectors. As 
such, P3s can be attracted to future HSR projects (despite its uncertain 
risks). With robust procurement laws, regulations, and guidelines 
managed by public authorities at all levels, why not extend the P3 
approach to build HSR? The political will in Canada already favors 
P3s. Moreover, the federal P3 Canada Fund directly supports 
sustainable transportation projects among provincial and municipal 
procurement agencies (both of which have vast experience with P3 
projects). The multidisciplinary nature of the P3 funding process 
among federal, provincial, and municipal governments has 
standardized P3s throughout Canada, thereby enabling P3s to deliver 
public assets on time and with cost savings. In other words, the 
foundation is there; we need to extend the P3 framework to fit the needs 
of HSR development. 
IX 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HSR DEVELOPMENT USING P3S IN 
CANADA 
After reviewing examples of challenges faced by public authorities 
on transportation matters, let us consider some recommendations for 
Canadian HSR development using principles and best practices of P3s. 
 
canada/us/documents/insights/final-p3-aig-whitepaper-brochure.pdf (last visited June 10, 
2017). 
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Recommendation 1: Harmonize P3 legislation with HSR Development 
to Create Standards 
• Newer forms of procurement legislation and regulations to fit 
HSR-related issues should be enacted. 
° This is already done for current municipal LRT projects. 
• High standards for private partners to follow should be created. 
Recommendation 2: Use Project Bundling from Light-Rail Transit and 
Roadway P3s 
• Project bundling integrates all stages of development: 
° Creates streamlined and efficient procurement processes; 
° Leads to cost savings; 
° Optimizes lifecycle which avoids delays by careful planning 
during each stage with investors; 
° Consolidates decision making; 
° Disciplines parties to proceed with one design and technology 
because frequent changes are avoided. 
• Using light-rail transit methodology, P3s focus all technical, 
financial, and legal issues on similar technologies and 
frameworks as in HSR. 
• P3s help the public and private sectors achieve targets over a 
lengthy period of time. 
• P3s provide a system of checks and balances; clear performance 
standards and targets are set to encourage private entities to not 
only raise sufficient capital to build HSR, but to manage their 
operations. 
• Helps avoid duplication of agencies and documents needed for 
RFQ and RFP stages. 
Recommendation 3: Get Public Consultation and Choice of P3 for HSR 
Development 
• P3s should be chosen for HSR development only if the P3 is 
more affordable than traditional procurement (public capital 
costs considerations should be avoided until the project is 
completed). 
° Traditional procurement is still effective, but for the sheer 
magnitude and scale of HSR, P3s may be better. 
• Each project should be vetted at the front end by feasibility 
studies, VfM analysis and risk assessments. 
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• Transfer of Risk—is there enough transferring risks from the 
public authority to the private partner to avoid public capital 
expenditures (and burdening the taxpayer)? 
• Clarification questions should be addressed to the HSR Project 
Manager. 
Recommendation 4: Institute Open and Fair Bidding Process for 
Qualified Bidders 
• Open and fair bidding processes foster competitive bids among 
qualified bidders. 
• A choice among experienced HSR developers or even among 
LRT developers who can adapt their plans to build HSR means 
two things: 
° (1) Bidders will get clear bid evaluative criteria in advance; 
and 
° (2) Domestic and international bids may be entertained, as is 
commonly found among any P3s offering HSR projects. 
• Qualified bidders’ participation likely means a choice within a 
diverse and powerful consortium of engineering/construction 
firms, architectural firms, equity investors, and lenders. 
° This strength in diversity brings added value to the table for 
complex public project development. 
• Using a fairness monitor or auditor to oversee the bidding 
process, and declaring that the P3 is open, fair, and competitive 
will ensure overall fairness. 
• Incentives should convince the private investor of a healthy 
return on investment for HSR development.113 
• The implication is that any HSR project will serve the public 
interest for a long period of time, and so revenue generation 
from the use of the service is attainable (through availability 
payments from the public authority and user fees). 
 
113 See generally ASS’N OF CONSULTING ENG’G COS., UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CANADA, http://www.acec.ca/files/resources/acec_P3_report 
_v3.pdf (last visited June 10, 2017) (The Association of Consulting Engineering Companies 
states: “Experience in Canada shows that the greatest benefit for both the public owner and 
the private sector P3 partner generally occurs when the private sector is contracted to 
maintain and operate the asset for twenty-five to thirty-five or more years in addition to 
designing, building and providing the financing for the asset.”). 
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• Private partners should get sufficient managerial control of 
projects. 
° This is premised on their expertise to help design, build, and 
operate transportation infrastructure by providing 
technologies and employing engineers, architects, and 
research scientists.114 
° As long as there is proper compliance monitoring of the 
private partner’s progress, the targets of the P3 can be 
maintained. 
• The fairness monitor should publish results of the P3 to the 
public. 
Recommendation 5: Structure the Procurement Process for HSR 
• The P3 should be structured for HSR development. 
° This means that designing, building, financing, operating, 
and maintaining HSR includes consideration of train station 
locations, track lines, signaling systems, and possible 
integration with conventional railway lines. 
• Private bidders must provide adequate disclosure to reveal all 
capabilities, skills, and technology for HSR development and 
their references should be checked. 
• Risk assessments must be determined from VfM assessments. 
° Whether the private partner would be exposed to market 
forces (e.g., financial crises) should also be considered. 
• Site investigations should be conducted to reveal the best place 
for laying dedicated HSR track and stations. 
Recommendation 6: Use the DBFMO model for HSR 
• Under the DBFMO model, a public owner enters into agreement 
with a consortium of private contractors (i.e., lenders, 
construction, project managers, architects, and engineering 
firms, often called “concessionaires”). 
• Whether there will be a debt guarantee for the private partner to 
ensure proper financing should be considered. 
• The consortium provides a range of services set out in the P3 
agreement. 
 
114 Bombardier, a Canadian hi-tech corporation based in Montreal, Québec, is a prime 
example of a business that researches and develops high-speed trains in Canada for export. 
High Speed Trains, BOMBARDIER, http://www.bombardier.com/en/transportation/pro 
ducts-services/rail-vehicles/high-speed-trains.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). It begs the 
obvious question—if a Canadian company manufactures high-speed trains for export to 
other nations, why is Canada not using HSR? 
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• At the end of the P3 agreement, the public owner takes over the 
HSR project. 
Recommendation 7: Create a Strong yet Flexible P3 Legal Framework 
for HSR 
• Canadian jurisdictions should adopt newer P3 legislation that 
creates a solid legal framework to apply P3s in HSR projects. 
This would give certainty to private investors to raise necessary 
capital costs. 
Recommendation 8: Adopt Best Practices from Light-Rail Transit and 
Roadway P3s 
• Because HSR is a transportation issue, it is necessary to draw 
best practices from light-rail transit and roadway P3s. 
Recommendation 9: Tailor P3 Proposal to Secure Federal Funding 
• Both provincial and municipal governments should tailor the P3 
project for HSR to be eligible for the P3 Canada Fund. 
° Relieving traffic congestion is one major requirement. HSR 
is built for this purpose which makes it more likely to be 
eligible. 
• Receiving federal funding would enable proper financing for the 
public authority and boost private investor confidence. 
• The proposal should include a Requirement Compliance Matrix 
(similar to the Netherlands). 
Recommendation 10: Have a Comprehensive and Flexible P3 
Agreement 
• Flexible provisions of the P3 agreement that account for 
unexpected events or changes should be ensured. 
° The partnership should absorb such changes and re-negotiate 
terms and conditions if necessary. 
• Key clauses in the agreement should include: 
° Conflict of Interest; 
° Duration—should be for thirty to fifty years for HSR; 
° Duties—outline specific duties (e.g., design, building, 
testing, etc.); 
°  Payments—ensure payments are based on the performance 
of the private partner upon completion of set targets; 
° Breach—enforce severe penalties upon breach by private 
partner; 
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° Risks 
• Risks should be assigned to a managing entity; and 
• The authors should consider whether the risks would be 
borne solely by the private partner, or between the public 
authority and private partner; 
° Prepare for Project Defaults 
• The authors should consider what happens if the private 
partner is unable to secure proper financing and if there 
would be a government bailout; 
° Quality Control and Compliance—testing of facilities and 
trains; and 
° Reversion—the HSR project should revert back to the public 
authority, but operations and maintenance may continue 
with private partner. 
CONCLUSION 
P3s serve as the embodiment of practical, efficient measures in 
Canadian public infrastructure development. They are a better 
alternative to traditional procurement. Led by rigorous procurement 
policies and laws, P3s are particularly helpful in building public assets 
when governments face infrastructure deficit problems. Here, there is 
sharing of powerful public and private resources. But the true success 
of P3s lies in project bundling—the combination of all stages of 
development with clear tasks, incentives, and goals into a single P3 
agreement. This creates certainty in completing the project, boosting 
investor confidence, and thus, participation in public projects. With this 
in mind, it is reasonably foreseeable that P3s could be useful for newer, 
unique forms of infrastructure in HSR. Because HSR has not yet 
developed in Canada, careful planning and delivery of high-speed rail 
can be achieved under the rigorous and results-oriented aspects of P3s. 
The P3 model is not the only policy choice for HSR, but it has a 
good track record in Canadian jurisdictions, as well as in nations 
currently using HSR. Infrastructure deficit problems often plague 
governments; it is difficult to raise capital costs to upgrade or build new 
public infrastructure assets. The financial burden placed on 
governments to spend on public assets is simply too great—hence, the 
need for private sector involvement. The private sector brings 
enormous capital, resources, expertise, and technology in helping 
public authorities build large, costly public assets. In short, the 
Canadian P3 experience has been outstanding. There is a united effort 
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by all levels of government to encourage P3s in public infrastructure 
development and to work with the private sector. 
In this sense, the push for transportation sustainability may convince 
Canadian lawmakers to pursue HSR using P3s. P3s enhance the 
regulatory experience for public infrastructure development. Given 
comparative P3s in public transportation, there are both healthy 
precedents to follow and lessons to be learned for Canada. The 
maturing P3 market in Canada makes P3s a popular choice for 
governments in Canada to build more complex projects like HSR, so 
long as the P3s are structured uniquely for the specific challenges of 
HSR. This success of P3s paves the way for practical and meaningful 
partnerships in making HSR a reality. While P3s have been used in 
other sectors such as health care, energy, and education, they are 
quickly becoming a policy choice for public authorities in 
transportation. In this sense, P3s represent the most optimistic choice 
to deliver HSR in Canada. 
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